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Modernization and militarization are closely associated tanzation
responds to the imperatives arising from the global modernizing process begun five 
centuries ago with the rise of the territorial state and with the destruction of the 
European feudalism and its gradual replacement by capitalist-based economy * To 
establish this association —  and the direct and indirect causal connection between 
them —  the discussion below first defines the principal characteristics of 
modernization as a global process of socio-economic change and political 
transformation and defines militarization in terms that can be linked to key 
characteristics of modernization Some of the implications of this argument for 
global arms control accords are subsequently outlined in the concluding section 
Aims of modernization will have to be re-directed and the means used by the world 
community in this pursuit will have to be re-defined if militarization is to remain 
the servant, not master, of modernization
PRINCIPAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERNIZATION
1 Search for Global Order and Legitimacy
As a social process, modernization has four characteristics that can be 
associated with militarization First, it is the search of peoples everywhere for a 
global order based on a claim of universal legitimacy The nation-state has emerged
* I should like to thank Andrew Ross for helpful criticism of this paper
2as the provisional answer to this aspiration The destruction of Christian unity and 
the eruption of internecine religious wars between Catholics and Protestants 
generated the need for an arbiter, independent of these communal struggles, to 
resolve differences and to protect both persons and property within territorially 
defined states and to provide for the collective security of populations —  
progressively defined as national entities —  against foreign opponents Thomas 
Hobbes' Leviathan became the model for western Europe The modern seculars state 
crystallized around hereditary monarchs who, basing their authority on divine right 
and blood, monopolized the functions of internal order and external security 
Religious and hereditary tests eroded eventually as determining principles of 
legitimate rule While political regimes today differ with respect to their claims 
to legitimately exercise the state's monopoly of violence, they almost all rest on 
some secular principle of legitimacy whether defined along liberal republican, 
democratic socialist, or autocratic lines of rule The Iranian revolution and
reactionary movements like Islamic fundamentalism are, ironically, evidence of 
modernity's ascendancy
The nation-state triumphed for several key reasons Its appeal was more broadly 
based than the personal loyalties underlying feudalism It elicited the support of 
rising entrepreneurial classes, appealed increasingly to artisans and small 
landowners and peasants, and absorbed the energies and talents of those elements of 
the old aristocracy, like France's de Tocqueville or the Prussian Junkers, who sensed 
the irresistible force of the new social and economic movements sweeping Europe  ^
Under the centralizing control of monarchical rule, the nation-state proved more 
successful than its opponents at mobilizing the material and human resources of the 
realm for war and economic growth ^
3The victory of the nation-state m  Europe was simultaneous with its extension to 
the globe as the principal vehicle for organizing the world community ^ The struggle 
among European states for continental dominion was widened to a global scale, 
encompassing peoples everywhere National survival, prosperity, and greatness 
justified empire and legitimated the manipulation of alien peoples and their 
exploitation for the benefit of Europe's ruling classes and populations Rival 
European states projected their local struggles to the world environment with the 
result that through colonization the modern world system became an extension of 
European politics Over five centuries to the present era, first Spam and Portugal, 
then Holland, Britain and France, and finally Germany and Italy successively entered 
the competition for European hegemony resting partially on empire abroad Europe's 
quarrels defined the world's political agenda The Euro-centric system prevailed 
until its collapse in 1945 with its temporary replacement by a bipolar system, 
polarized between the United States and the Soviet Union
Since 1945, the world community has been in the grip of two movements, both 
rooted in the nation-state The first has been the pursuit of competing imperial
systems by the superpowers They may be viewed as just the latest in a long
succession of nation-state contestants bent on fashioning a world order to suit their 
aims and interests The superpowers, as their predecessors, have so far been 
frustrated in their quest for dominion by their counterbalancing rivalry The 
superpowers also confront scores of new nation-states in the decolonized southern 
hemisphere as well as the old but still vigorous states of Europe and Japan, strong 
regional powers with a global political and economic reach This network of 
nation-states limits the hegemonic pretensions of Moscow and Washington The 
centripetal force of the superpower struggle and the centrifugal tendencies of third 
state rivalries around the globe obscure the victory of the nation-state as the
4provisional answer to the imperative underlying modernization the search for a more 
inclusive and reliable order than that afforded by inherited or traditional forms of 
political organization
2 Search for Welfare
The demand for ever greater levels of prosperity is the second distinguishing 
feature of modernization Populations around the world refuse to accept the low and 
deprived material standards of life to which they were born Emulated is the example 
of developed states, located principally in the northern hemisphere, which have 
enjoyed progressive and accumulating economic expansion since the fifteenth century 
Commercial capitalism followed by state-led mercantilist practices induced the search 
for raw materials, the internal development of European markets, and the expansion of 
trade first to the Mediterranean littoral, then to the New World, and, subsequently, 
to Asia and Africa Beginning with the eighteenth century, commercial and 
mercantilist capitalism gradually gave way to industrial and finance capitalism The 
process of constructing a world capitalist economy on which the wealth of the 
European states increasingly depended was completed by the end of the nineteenth 
century While a European centered global order collapsed as a consequence of the 
destruction wrought by World Wars I and II, liberal western capitalism survived as a 
consequence of a strong and expansionist American economy and the defeat of the 
protectionist imperial regimes of Germany, Italy and Japan
Even before the emergence of the United States as capitalism's champion, 
perceived inequities of the capitalist system led to political movements and 
revolutionary forces that created Socialist and Communist regimes, committed to state 
ownership of the means of production as an antidote to the real and alleged excesses 
of capitalist market practices Industrialization was not so much rejected, as were
5the mechanisms by which its productive fruits were to be distributed and future 
investment priorities determined In place of the market, distributive decisions on 
profits, wages, and investments were assumed by state officials, exercising power 
through mass-based parties With decolonization, collectivist solutions to economic 
growth gained additional force The western, capitalist states were challenged in 
the North by the Communist bloc and by developing states of the South which often 
preferred a Soviet to an American model of modernization
3 Search for Scientific Discovery and Technological Progress
The search for greater world security and wealth is associated with a third 
characteristic of modernization the unique prestige enjoyed by scientific discovery 
and technological advancement Traditional man expected little or no change in 
nature or society He accepted his fate as a product of God's will, blind force or 
social inheritance There existed few widely accepted objective tests for physical 
or social truth Traditional explanations of the physical universe reinforced social 
and political controls exercised by religious leaders or rulers claiming divine 
investment Once scientific knowledge established itself as an independent source of 
truth, it challenged traditional religious and social authority and undermined the 
legitimacy of these institutions relying on these principles of rule In applying 
scientific knowledge to technological innovation, modernizing societies created a 
powerful instrument for change, physical and social, whose limits have yet to be 
fully exploited
With scientific knowledge and technological progress, man could control and 
shape physical nature to his liking He also had access to an unprecedented array of 
powerful instruments to shape his socio-economic conditions and political destiny 
What could not be anticipated, as discussed below, was the extent to which the
6principal beneficiary of this new knowledge and know-how would be the nation-state 
Science and technology have proved critical m  assisting nation-states to respond to 
the security dilemma underlying the global nation-state system and to the welfare 
demands of populations who either consent or are coerced to pledge loyalty to them
4 Search for Personal Worth
Modernization, defined by the globalized nation-state, industrialization, and 
the spread of science and technology, has produced new institutions to ensure its 
ascendancy and spread These institutions of governance, of economic productivity, 
and of knowledge acquisition and application confer power, privileges, and position 
on the elites who command and control them Status is determined, not as before, 
through inheritance, blood, or ascription, but through talent, performance, or 
societally defined tests or criteria of utility As Samuel P Huntington and Robert 
Dahl observe, "The traditional distribution of status along a single bifurcated 
structure characterized by "dispersed inequalities gives way to pluralistic status 
structures characterized by dispersed inequalities
At the same time modernization implies a conception of personal merit that is 
radically egalitarian Talent and performance, as tests of individual worth, compete 
with the conflicting claim that equality, unmixed by qualifications of national 
origin or ethnic, religious tribal or racial background, should alone be a proper 
measure of personal value This levelling process, as de Tocqueville recognized,^ 
unleashes pressures for socio-economic improvement and expectations of popular 
participation in the domestic politics of states While mass participation has 
become a common feature of modern rule, participation variously manifests itself, 
often m  contradictory fashions e g  in authoritarian regimes, through mass 
mobilization by elites, operating through nationally based parties or bureaucracies,
7or in liberal democracies, through public opinion expressed through open elections, 
media representations, or private associations and pressure groups
II MILITARIZATION AND MODERNIZATION
How is modernization associated with militarization9 How are its four 
characteristics —  the rise of the globalized nation-state, worldwide demands for 
welfare, the spread of science and technology, and the re-definition of personal 
worth based on talent, performance, and equality —  linked to militarization7 Some 
notion of what is meant by militarization is essential if a relation is to be 
established between these two powerful forces that shape the world community
Militarization refers to all forms of social activity which are directly or 
indirectly related to the organization of violence for the purpose of deterring, 
defending against, or defeating an opponent The need for organized violence 
initially arises from the conflict of political units which are unable to resolve 
their differences by mutual consent, by accepting rules for non-coercive competition, 
or by an appeal to universally applicable moral principles or laws The opponents 
rely on violence or its threat to impose their demands on each other They are thus 
locked, as Schelling suggests,^ in a bargaining process where killing, maiming, 
hurting, and damaging are the instruments by which they seek to have their way 
Carried to the extreme, with no other limitation on their struggle than the 
competition of opposing will with force as the arbiter, the clash approaches what 
Clausewitz has termed "pure war" ® Clausewitz" "pure war" may be extended to what 
Kenneth Bouldmg terms a "pure theory of threat systems," wherein political 
communities devote all of their time, energy, and resources to preparation for war
Q
and do so in the pursuit of what is perceived as a social good The Napoleonic 
Wars, World Wars I and II, the religious wars of the seventeenth century, the Punic
8Wars, and the struggles between the Greek city-states provide examples of conflicts 
that enveloped and absorbed almost all social relations within and between political 
units Militarization thus includes not only the preparations for warfare and its 
execution but "an emphasis," as Alfred Vagts observes, "on military considerations, 
spirit, ideals, and scales of value, in the life of states National human and
material resources are oriented toward activities associated with expenditures for 
military forces and arms as well as for industrialization, research, and development 
dedicated primarily to armaments Conversely, opportunity costs are incurred in 
terms of civil pursuits defined by the production of consumer goods and services, 
education, welfare, the arts, and leisure
1 Response to Order and Legitimacy The Nation-State and the Permanent War System
Analysts of modernization have generally excluded the nation-state from 
their consideration as a vehicle of modernization of the global community They 
have preferred instead to view modernization as a phenomenon occuring 
principally within the borders of the territorial state ^  Consequently, the 
distinguishing feature of the nation-state system —  war —  is excluded from 
examination The nation-state is fundamentally different from all other social 
groupings because it monopolizes the legitimate use of organized violence ^  If 
this critical feature of global relations is excluded from an analysis and 
evaluation of the modernization process, internal or domestic socio-economic and 
political institutions which respond to the conflict producing sources of 
interstate relations appear alien and exogenous to the modernization process 
rather than a response to it Forgotten is the historical lesson that the 
success of the nation-state, as a modernizing force within the global political 
community, was due precisely to its capacity to wage war better than alternative
9forms of social organization Michael Howard reminds us that "the growing 
capacity of European governments to control, or at least to tap, the wealth of 
the community, and from it to create mechanisms —  bureaucracies fiscal 
systems, armed forces —  which enable them yet further to extend their control 
over the community, is one of the central developments in the historical era 
which, opening in the latter part of the seventeenth century, has continued to 
our own time The nation-state, first within Europe and, later, m  the
developing world, reflected an expectation, translated into a demand during the 
decolonization era, that the global community be based on a principle of order 
and legitimacy that transcended religious ethnic or class origin and even 
cultural and linguistic differences The success of the nation-state was 
testimony to the quest for a unit that could function as the vehicle for an 
enlarging consciousness of unity in organizing political affairs in opposition 
to restrictive, parochial, or non-secular principles of organization
Excluding the nation-state from an analysis of modernization also 
simplifies the problems that must be resolved if the needs and demands animating 
the modernization process are to be satisfied ^  Controlling violence as a 
problem is narrowed to control within the state although the issue facing the 
global community is limiting violence simultaneously within and between states 
The possibility of total militarization, defined along lines suggested by 
Clausewitz' conception of "pure war" or Bouldmg's notion of "pure threat 
systems," arises today from nation-state conflicts that presently revolve, 
interdependently, around East-West and North-South axes The superpower power 
conflict is as intrinsic to the global modernization process as is the process 
of nation-state building m  the countries lying largely in the southern 
hemisphere Viewed from an historical perspective, encompassing over five
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centuries of evolution, the distinction between developing and developed nations 
loses much of its force if one views them as different elements of a single if 
heterogeneous, political community confronting, as a collectivity, the 
overriding issue of establishing a stable and what is perceived as a legitimate 
global order While each unit may well differ for the foreseeable future with 
respect to its internal definition of modernity, all face the issue of order as 
a common problem to be resolved together if a workable international political 
system is to be progressively formulated and instituted
Even if nuclear war had not raised the prospect of total war, one would 
still be obliged to address the problem of the militarization of the 
modernization process If one examines various measures of militarization the 
trends are markedly upward Table 1 indicates that there were increases between 
1973 and 1983 in world military expenditures for developed and developing 
states, armed forces, the ratio of military expenditures to GNP (accompanied by 
an increase m  the rate of GNP growth), and military spending per capita Only 
the ratio of military expenditures to central government expenditures and armed 
forces per 1000 of population declined
Arms deliveries and agreements also climbed m  this period In current 
dollars, world totals rose in current dollars from $56 9 billion in 1973-1976 to 
$147 3 billion in a comparable three year period from 1981-1984 The 
corresponding totals for developed states in these two time periods are, 
respectively, $15 1 billion and $27 6 billion Those for developing states show 
an even steeper ascent from $41 9 billion to $119 7 billion^
What seems clear is that the security dilemma, endemic first to the 
evolution of the nation-state system within Europe which led to successively 
larger wars in the nineteenth and twentieth century, now absorbs the world
TABLE 1
MEASURES OF MILITARIZATION
1973 1983
1 MILITARY EXPENDITURES ( m  billions of constant 1982 dollars)
■florid 564 9 778 9
Developed States 469 7 616 3
Developing States 95 3 162 6
2 ARMED FORCES (in thousands)
World 25580 28355
Developed States 10484 10827
Developing States 15096 17528
3 RATIO OF MILITARY
EXPENDITURES TO GNP
World 5 7 6 1
Developed States 5 8  6 2
Developing States 5 4  5 8
4 MILITARY EXPENDITURES
PER CAPITA
World 144 166
Developed States 458 557
Developing States 32 45
5 RATIO OF MILITARY
EXPENDITURES TO CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
World 24 1 19 2
Developed States 24 5 19 5
Developing States 22 5 18 5
6 ARMED FORCES PER
1000 PEOPLE
World 6 5 6 1
Developed States 10 2 9 8
Developing States 5 2  4 9
Source U S , Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1985 (Washington, D C  U S  
Government Printing Office, 1985), p 47
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community The spread of the security dilemma has three distinctive but 
mutually reinforcing features which institutionalize regional and global 
conflict and instability and militarizes international relations First, the 
superpower conflict draws third states into its vortex The superpower conflict 
replaced the struggles among the European states as the principal axis around 
which world politics revolves These two competitors, with military means 
capable of being speedily directed to any part of the globe, advance 
fundamentally different visions of how the modernization process should proceed 
These two secular religions clash over the principles of world order, economic 
solutions to material plenty and equity, and conceptions of personal worth and 
social status Whatever the merits of these ideological stances, they still 
serve, as Charles de Gaulle never ceased to contend,^ the parochial national 
needs and interests of their superpower proponents
The superpower competition and arms race that has motored world conflict 
since World War II penetrates regional disputes arising from the same security 
dilemma underlying the Cold War The East-West blocs testify to this process 
The superpower struggle m  the developing world provides additional evidence 
The battlegrounds today are Central America, the Middle East, southwest Asia, 
and southern Africa whereas the Balkans, Korea, and Vietnam were the cockpits of 
conflict a decade or more earlier Even the all-but-defunct non-aligned 
movement can be viewed as essentially spawned by the superpower conflict since 
it sought to preserve some measure of independence for the newly emerging states 
of the South from superpower depredations and the risk of nuclear conflict
Conversely, local rivalries risk assuming a global significance as regional 
opponents seek superpower assistance m  resolving their quarrel on favorable 
terms During the era of colonial empires, the European states performed this
12
policing role The dismantling of the Euro-centnc system left few effective 
international agencies to fill the vacuum left by the withdrawal of European 
forces The United Nations, divided against itself, has failed to perform this 
role, notwithstanding some successes in minor peacekeeping roles Its 
effectiveness has been progressively narrowed and marginalized by superpower 
discord and the intransigence of local states which reject its edicts or advice 
What is left to preserve peace is the precarious counterbalancing military power 
of local rivalries International security leans on a weak reed Regional arms 
races m  Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia deepen the superpower global 
arms competition The military requirements of superpower intervention, m  
turn, must be valued upward as local resistance is strengthened by the growth in 
the size and sophistication of national armed forces, the development of 
indigenous arms production facilities, and easier access to multilateral supply 
sources for weapons, equipment and material
Third, the strength of the delicately woven cloth of security arrangements 
defining interstate conflicts is further tested by the rending impact of 
modernization on traditional societies Since World War II these societies have
unravelled at a faster rate than the new classes and elites produced by 
modernization could be woven together into a cohesive fabric to replace anciens 
regimes The worst of both worlds is visited on the world community, as m  
Lebanon, where inherited communal rivalries clash with new secular forces within 
an international environment driven by irreconcilable regional rivalries and the 
superpower conflict At stake is the future of modernization, at issue is the 
heightened militarization of the international system between and within
states
13
2 Response of Militarization to Welfare
The security dilemma confronting modern states has also generated a 
requirement for the creation of military industrial-scientific-technological 
complexes (MISTs) to develop and produce weapons The quest for political 
independence prompts states to pursue, within their resource possibilities, 
autarchic weapons acquisition policies, preferring indigenous production to 
external dependency The state's claimed monopoly of the legitimate exercise of 
violence would have little effect if it did not simultaneously seek a 
corresponding control over the means of arms production The rise of the modern 
state has been almost synchronous, if not synonymous, with its weapons making 
capability The superpowers are almost totally independent of other states in 
weapons production Both also supply most of the arms sold or transferred to 
third states The developed states of the North also meet much of their own 
arms needs France, as the world's third arms supplier, is essentially 
autonomous in meeting its military requirements The other major states of East 
and West Europe, measured by arms sales, also possess impressive arms production 
capabilities Between 1979-1983, seven East and West European states delivered 
$46 5 billion in weapons to third states The superpowers transferred weapons 
valued near $97 billion during the same period The Europeans controlled 
approximately 27 percent of a $170 billion market, the United States and the 
Soviet Union accounted, respectively, for 33 3 and 23 7 per cent of world trade 
in arms ^
One particularly striking feature of the post-colonial period is the growth 
in the number and sophistication of weapons production centers in the developing
14
world In 1950, there were only five countries producing one or more major 
weapon systems, including ships, armor, aircraft, or missiles In successive 
decades, this number rose from 14 (1960), to 21 (1970), and, finally, 26 
(1980) Over this period the number of states producing one or more systems 
within one of the four major weapons categories also increased
Table 2 outlines the enlarging capabilities of developing states to 
manufacture a wide array of systems In 1960, only seven countries in the 
developing world had entered the aircraft industry They turned out 15 
different systems Twenty years later 13 countries produced 67 types of 
equipment In 1960 no developing state produced ground armor, a generation 
later six countries produced 17 systems, ranging from tanks to armored 
bndgelayers The same upward trends are visible for missiles and naval 
vessels By 1980, nine states were producing 26 different kinds of missiles, 
and 25 countries were constructing 45 naval systems within six ship categories 
Six countries (Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Israel, and South Africa) 
maintained production lines for all major weapons systems 7 Some, like Israel 
and Brazil, succeeded in developing their own research and development base for 
some arms Depending on the system or state, one can discern a progressive 
expansion among developing states of weapons development capability defined at 
the lowest level of capability as licensed component production to —  in 
succeeding orders of sophistication —  licensed system production, system
modification and reverse engineering, dependent R and D and production, and
20independent R and D
Once in place, these MISTs tend to make claims on internal investment 
resources that progressively enlarge their impact on their national economies 
and, collectively, on the world economy In its initial stages, the MIST
TABLE 2
AIRCRAFT
ARMS PRODUCTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
1960 1970 1980
1960 1970 
// of # of # of # of
1980
# of // of
countries systems countries ¡systems countries systems
Fighters 1 2 3 4 6 10
Trainers (jet) 3 3 4 4 3 5
Trainers (basic) 6 7 5 6 11 13
Maritime (recon- - - - - 2 2
naissance)
Transports 1 1 4 6 8 11
Aircraft (engines) 1 1 2 2 6 8
Helicopters 1 1 2 2 11 15
Avionics - - - - 3 3
Total 7 15 8 24 18 67
GROUND EQUIPMENT
Tanks - - 3 3 5 6
APC - - 1 2 5 6
Armored Cars - - 2 2 2 2
Reconnaissance - - - - 2 2
Vehicles
Armored Bndgelayers . 1 1
Total - - 5 7 6 17
MISSILES
Surface-to-air — — _ 5 6
Air-to-ground - - 1 1 5 6
Air-to-air 1 1 2 2 5 5
Surface-to-surface 1 1 1 1 3 4
Anti-tank - - 1 1 7 8
Total 1 2 5 5 9 26
NAVAL VESSELS
Frigates 1 1 1 1 4 5
Corvettes 2 2 2 2 1 1
Patrol Craft 8 8 13 13 20 25
Submarines - - - - 3 3
Amphibious Craft 1 1 2 2 4 4
Support Craft 6 6 4 4 7 7
Total 13 18 15 22 25 45
Sources Andrew L Ross Arms Production m  Developing Countries The Continuing 
Proliferation of Conventional Weapons No N-1615-AF, Rand Corporation 
Note, Santa Monica, California, 1981 pp 16-19 and Stockholm Internationa 
Peace Research Institute World Armament and Disarmament Yearbook 1974, 
pp 230-258, and ibid, 1980 pp 168-173 (Cambridge Oelgeschlager Gunn 
and H a m  Inc ) The People’s Republic of China is excluded
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complex of a state responds primarily to security imperatives The historic 
growth of weapons producing centers m  the developed world appear to fit such a 
pattern of development Set in motion, the MIST complex tends to perpetuate and 
enlarge its hold on a state's economy and welfare producing policies A The 
MIST complex can claim to produce a useful public service and product —  
security Added justification for an autarchic weapons policy is also found in 
the claim that the independence of the nation-state and the maintenance of the 
domestic regime are pre-conditions for the material development of the society 
As their resource and bureaucratic base expands, MIST complexes gradually 
gain increasing control over their demand function Not only military but 
civilian goods and services are offered as evidence of the welfare producing 
capability of the MIST system These are defined in terms of import 
substitution policies to preserve scarce foreign reserves, increased exports to 
lower unit costs, stimulation of R and D, and high employment, especially of 
skilled workers, technicians, and scientific personnel The privileged access 
of the MIST complex to policy circles and its central bureaucratic position 
enlarge its capacity to create and stimulate demand for its products and 
services Its power derives from its manipulation of the symbols of security 
and welfare, fundamental societal values, from its self-serving interpretation, 
circulated in the media, of its contribution to social well-being, from its 
unique importance in the national decision-making process, and from its control 
over the participants within the MIST system In the latter case, the processes 
of recruitment, promotion, worker and professional socialization, and punishment
fall within the purview of MIST leaders
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MISTs re-define the traditionally understood trade-off between guns and 
butter No choice need be made Indeed, the leadership speaks of "more butter 
( 1 e welfare) because of guns (security) " The arms complexes of the developed 
systems do not present themselves as burdens on the national treasury but as 
assets in welfare production This same positive stance also manifests itself 
m  developing countries, as the partisans of MIST systems m  India,^  Israel,^ 
and Brazil^ —  advanced weapons producing states —  emphasize the economic and 
technological advantages of military weapons development
Whether these claims are true or not is less compelling than that they are 
perceived as true Conversely, it is very difficult, partly because MISTs 
control the information needed to evaluate them, to measure conclusively the 
opportunity costs of adopting a model of development dependent on military 
production Arms production and sales by developing countries continue to 
mount Presently concentrated in nine states (excluding China), arms production 
m  1980 (licensed and indigenous) reached a high of $1 2 billion in 1975 prices 
An estimated one million workers were directly engaged in the arms industry, 
with India topping the list (280,000), followed by South Africa (90,000), Israel 
(75,000), and Egypt (75,000) From a negligible level in the 1960s, arms 
exports by developing states, currently representing four percent of the global
market, shot dramatically upward in 1970s, reaching a high of $250 million in
251982 J By contrast, in the developed world, more than 10 million workers m  
1982 were engaged directly m  arms production,^  and arms deliveries by these 
states were roughly 25 times greater than their counterparts in the developing 
world
MISTs are subject to what Johan Galtung characterizes as an Eigendynamik of 
economic growth The incentives to expand, defined as the continued supply of
17
investment to keep the system operating at efficient levels, appear compelling 
"Thus, if the raw materials are there, the labor is there, researchers have done 
their job so that the model of what to produce exists, and the whole 
administrative machinery is present, there will be a tendency to try to provide 
the missing capital rather than to send the raw materials back, dismiss the 
workers, let the research findings be shelved unused, and transfer the 
administrators elsewhere These pressures work quite independently of the
security considerations that may have originally led to the organization of a 
MIST complex They have a ratchet effect on managing conflict relations between 
opponents A relaxation of tensions does not lead immediately to a reduction in 
arms making capability as the arms complex resists reductions m  its size or 
influence
3 Response of Militarization to Scientific and Technological Development
As nation-states and MISTs have responded to security and welfare 
imperatives, they have relied increasingly on scientific discovery and 
technological development in pursuing their aims and interests The modern 
state cannot be conceived apart from the close, symbiotic relation between its 
spread and the development of techno-scientific establishments and the evolution 
of increasingly destructive warfare ^ It is now commonplace to note that armed 
struggles between rival states are now fought increasingly in their respective 
laboratories Progress in basic physics, chemistry, and mathematics opened the 
way to the development of new technologies These produced a revolution in 
metals and materials, communications, transportation, electronics, and energy 
As men and states learned to understand and control nature, not merely adapt to 
its exigencies and seeming vicissitudes, they have applied techno-scientific
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tools of control to better their material condition and, not surprisingly, to 
resolve their conflictual relations Science and technology now simultaneously 
serve beneficent and hostile aims The result is a continuous, cumulative, and 
potentially unlimited process of new product developments and services, 
expanding economic growth and wealth-production, and, simultaneously, the 
mounting lethality of conventional and nuclear weapons measured by the rapid 
speed and distance of their delivery, destuctiveness, and target efficiency
The organization of national and international scientific and technological 
resources has not proceeded along a defined, linear course, free of other 
societal needs or forces It has not evolved as an unmixed good wherein 
scientific discoveries and technological advancements were mobilized and 
directed altruistically to mankind's socio-economic improvement As often as 
not, these resources were mobilized for war and coercion It is no accident 
nuclear physics and engineering were given significant impetus by World War II 
The same claim can be made for progress m  naval and air transport, civilian 
communications, ground transportation, electronics, and modern computational 
systems That these developments could well have occurred m  the absence of the 
push given them by war, while certainly true, is somewhat beside the point from 
an historical perspective Their synchronous evolution suggests more than a 
happenstance relation As a social process, one has supported the other
Conflicts between modern nation-state and those arising at a socio-economic 
level from modernizing processes within states prompted and guided —  as they 
still do today —  the militarization of global scientific and technological 
resources along nation-state lines It was only to be expected that models of 
modernization —  the postwar Japanese case notwithstanding —  would rest on the 
assumption of scientific and technological progress as a precondition of
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national security and domestic welfare If one examines France's postwar 
socio-economic and political development, for example, it was explicitly 
patterned after the American case The leadership of the French Fourth and 
Fifth Republics consciously applied an American-inspired development plan, aimed 
at broadening and deepening France's scientific and technological base, so that 
France would be propelled along the same path as the United States toward 
economic and military strength One sees the same forces operating throughout
o nthe developing world
Confidence in science and technology as the instrument of national security 
and welfare remains a powerful modernizing and militarizing force Investment 
m  national scientific research and development is for most modern or 
modernizing nation-states skewed heavily toward military weapons The 
ministries of defense are important funnels for the allocation of research and 
development funds often on a scale surpassing what is channeled through 
educational establishments and industrial programs Over half of the R and D 
resources of the French government and approximately one-third of all R and D 
expended by the French state stems from expenditures made by the Ministry of 
Defense The Soviet Union appears no less committed to an economic
development strategy tied closely to sustained military modernization Its 
foreign assistance program, not surprisingly, is consistent with this strategy 
in assigning priority to arms transfers and military over economic aid to
-5 0developing countries
The American National Defense Education Act to foster scientific education 
was principally spurred by the fear of a scientific-technological breakthrough 
in the Cold War m  the wake of the Soviet launching of the first man-made 
satellite in 1957 A generation after the initial passage of this legislation,
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the search for scientific and technological solutions to national welfare and 
security concerns proceeds unabated These sentiments and expectations are at 
the surface of President Ronald Reagan's promotion of the idea of a Strategic 
Defense Initiative to re-construct fundamentally the nuclear balance of terror 
defining U S -Soviet strategic relations
Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope It 
is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet 
missile threat with measures that are defensive Let us turn to 
the very strengths in technology that spawned our great industrial 
base and that have given us the quality of life we enjoy today
What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that 
their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U S 
retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and 
destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own 
soil or that of our allies7
I know this is a formidable, technical task, one that may not be 
accomplished before the end of this century Yet, current 
technology has attained a level of sophistication where it's 
reasonable for us to begin this effort It will take years, 
probably decades of effort on many fronts There will be failures 
and setbacks, just as there will be successes and breakthroughs
But isn't it worth every investment necessary to free the world 
from the threat of nuclear war7^
Science and technology are expected to resolve the security problems to which their 
own success has contributed Societal and state resources are marshalled to 
modernize the military establishment and, paradoxically, to perpetuate the 
modernization process
4 Response of Militarization to Personal Worth and Social Status
A final function served by militarization is its response to the rising 
expectation of populations everywhere for a differential definition of personal worth 
based on talent and performance and, conversely, on a notion of fundamental equality
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While both reject birth and blood as well as religious, ethnic, linguistic or racial 
tests of individual merit, modern military organizations and MIST complexes are built 
on differential professional standards that rest ostensibly on objective performance 
criteria Those who rise to ranks of importance are accorded access to power and 
special privileges that distinguish them from their peers In the modern state, high 
position in the military establishment and in those structures castellated around it 
must normally be earned through advanced educational degrees, long apprenticeship 
within a military or civilian bureaucracy, and tested loyalty to the professional 
code and organizational needs of the military system The benefits of loyalty and 
performance —  power, position and privilege —  may, of course, be enjoyed through 
service in other valued socio-economic and political structures —  in industry, 
finance, education, or the media But to the degree that militarization responds to 
the personal needs of the modernizing individual, its hold on the modernization 
process is tightened and the state's resources are deflected to lethal concerns
MISTs and military structures recruit society's best and brightest Talent that 
might otherwise fill non-coercive roles is siphoned off into activities intimately 
tied to organized coercion and violence In the absence of other outlets for 
ambition and talent, military establishments and their supporting MISTs discharge 
what are perceived as an indispensable role in discovering new talent, in socializing 
new generations to the norms of modernity, and m  investing high social value m  the
Q /
activities of a significant segment of a nation's leadership classes
As the French Revolution demonstrated, the military also respond to egalitarian 
compulsions within modern society Since the French Revolution, the citizen has beeft 
defined as a soldier Together, they are valued facets of what is posited as one 
integrated national personality The destitute and deprived, as well as the gifted 
and advantaged, find outlets for social acceptance in the armed forces New
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possibilities for personal satisfaction and advancement are available for those from 
even the lowest rungs of the social ladder Note, for example, the disproportionate 
number of Blacks in U S armed forces relative to their number m  the American 
population, a circumstance partly explicable by the blockages to personal betterment 
operating within American society ^  Observe, too, the number of governmental 
leaders, particularly those holding positions of power in the developing world, who 
rise from modest circumstances to high position after a long incubation within the 
military bureaucracy The rise of military officers to national political 
leadership, like Gamal Nasser and Anwar Sadat in Egypt, Mengistu Haile Mariam m  
Ethiopia, John Doe in Liberia, and Mu'ammar Khaddafy in Libya are symptomatic of 
tendencies within modernization that respond as much to the personal expectations and 
needs of modern man as to military requirements of national security
The personal satisfactions accorded by the military and its ancillary support 
mechanisms —  for differentiation and equality —  are complemented by the discharge 
of critical socio-political roles For many nation-states, particularly those m  the 
developing world, the army is the nation In some instances it is the primary 
vehicle m  building a nation to replace the local, familial, tribal, or communal 
bonds broken by the march of modernity It infuses a sense of national consciousness 
and central authority within societies in the throes of rapid and disruptive social 
change This national integrative function is hardly unique to the twentieth 
century Prussia was first an army before it was a nation Using the military to 
enforce integration can also be costly Witness civil strife m  Nigeria in the 
1960s, the decimation of Cambodian society a decade later, and the pursuit of a 
revolutionary reconstruction of the Ethiopian nation with little attention devoted to 
the basic care and nurturing of the population On the other hand, when civilian 
rule breaks down, as in Turkey, the army may act as the self-styled guardian of the
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state until societal conflict can be brought under control, but inevitably at a cost 
to personal freedom and, as often as not, to socio-economic development ^
SYSTEMIC IMPLICATIONS OF MODERNIZATION 
AND MILITARIZATION ON ARMS CONTROL
The implications of the preceding analysis are sobering First, modernization 
is no automatic answer to militarization It is part of the problem since its 
imperatives, as these have been historically recorded, have directly and indirectly 
contributed to the militarization of relations between states and that of 
socio-economic and political development within states This dilemma is most acutely 
confronted when one examines the war-prone tendencies of the nation-state system 
The nation-state provisionally resolved the need for personal and collective 
security Possessing a monopoly over organized violence, it could arbitrate internal 
differences between clashing factions and impose an order backed by courts and 
coercion Against foreign enemies, it could wage war more efficiently and 
effectively than city-states or feudal lords As Hobbes made clear, much of its 
claim to legitimacy rested on its ability to provide internal and external security 
War, too, was legitimated since it authoritatively settled differences between states 
when other modes of resolution failed It served as useful medium of exchange in 
estimating the power of states, much as the free market settled accounts between 
buyers and sellers
So long as the nation-state could wage war effectively, its authority to rule 
those pledging loyalty to it remained essentially intact Now that war, especially 
global nuclear war, threatens the nation-state and the incipiently anarchical system 
on which the tenuous governance of the world community has been built, the claim of 
the nation-state to legitimacy is seriously impaired Total war threatens to rend
the tie between function —  successful war-making as the prerequisite of security —  
and the legitimacy of the state flowing from the discharge of this function The 
right of the state to monopolize organized violence is fundamentally challenged In 
this light, there is a kernel of truth m  the argument, advanced by Kenneth Boulding 
and others, that the war-system and national security establishments are insecurity 
systems since they cannot guarantee security and their arms competition threatens the 
security that they claim to accord
The growing measures and modes of lethality at the disposal of a world of 
nation-states erode the viability of the nation-state and the war system on which it 
is based The very effectiveness of the nation-state in waging wars —  once a 
solution to personal and collective security during the long breakdown of the feudal 
system —  is now a major threat to world order The security dilemma, intrinsic to 
the nation-state system, drives the militarization of the modernization process In 
attempting to address one issue —  security —  the modern state, in competition with 
itself, threatens the world community The ironic consequence is that modernization 
is itself its own enemy since it is a primary source of potentially de-stabilizmg 
militarization How the world community will extricate itself from this self-imposed 
impasse is not clear, for the nation-state has never been more ascendant, faute de 
mieux, over other conceivable social alternatives in organizing the world community, 
yet never has it been as vulnerable to its own potentially self-destructive 
tendencies
Second, if the world community insists on modernization and yet is threatened by 
its lethal elements and if there exists no arbiter, as before, in the form of a 
powerful monarch to resolve the quarrels of feudal lords, then one must primarily 
count on the imperfect, self-regulating mechanisms of the system itself until more 
stable and less coercive mechanisms for global social control are in place A
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premium must be placed, therefore, on arms control and on buying time until such 
mechanisms can be fashioned, their implementation negotiated, and their 
institutionalization ensured
As for arms control, the growth of centers of organized violence around the 
globe establishes an objective condition advising the extension of the concept of 
arms control to the entire global security system 37 In its simplest form, arms 
control may be understood as the definition of rules for the use or threat of force 
between adversaries by which they mutually regulate their competition Since the 
world security system is increasingly interdependent, wherein the eruption of 
violence in one part of the globe affects others, rule-making m  conducting war and 
in manipulating threats between states cannot be confined only to the superpowers 
Such a narrow approach has several drawbacks States whose interests are affected by 
superpower conflict or condominium have few avenues to promote their views and to 
act, implicitly, as counterbalances to the superpower arms race On the other hand, 
the damaging impact of local conflicts are not easily confined to a region Long 
distances and poor communications no longer separate areas of the globe as before 
Because opponents at regional and global levels possess such destructive military 
capabilities, potentially damaging to each other and to third states, they exercise 
as a matter of fact and circumstance a droit de regard —  a right to take and give 
notice of each other's preparations for war Mutual recognition of these opponent 
and third state rights, implicitly acknowledged in the superpower SALT and START
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processes, prepares the way not only for mutual acceptance and legitimation of 
military modernization but the institutionalization of regional and global arms 
control processes as prerequisites for the creation and maintenance of order-bearing 
regimes between states
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If arms control accords can limit the size of national arsenals, reduce the pace 
of weapons development, and stabilize arms competition by mutual legitimation by 
opponents of their modernizing programs, then another major purpose of such accords 
is served They buy time Tension-less time is needed to afford the opportunity to 
construct alternative structures and institutions, primarily within states, to 
satisfy the welfare, knowledge acquisition and application, and personal needs of 
populations Unless these imperatives of modernization are addressed, the world 
community will be perpetually condemned to revolve in a vicious circle of its own 
making Conflict and arms races will compel increases m  defense spending, the 
expansion of military establishments, and the growth of MISTS, correspondingly, 
elites and mass needs will be met through an increasingly militarized modernization 
process
Creating alternatives for personal and collective satisfaction will take time, 
resources, and the mobilization of political will to withstand the resistance to 
change of those whose personal stake is rooted in the current military environment 
A less war-prone world implies not only the construction of international regimes to 
regulate and resolve interstate differences but also, and of equal importance, the 
erection of domestic supports to uphold the inevitably fragile arms control 
arrangements that one currently expects from nation-states which are jealous of their 
independence and prerogatives To build arms control constituencies across 
nation-state boundaries implies non-governmental contacts based on professional and 
personal contacts that promise to have a long-term impact on moderating the deep and 
genuine differences currently splitting governments and political regimes Since 
modernization generates global interdependences in welfare creation, in 
techno-scientific development, and in defining human rights and personal worth, one 
can conceivably build on these elements of modernity —  and on elite and mass
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sentiment associated with them —  m  checking the damaging and debilitating 
tendencies of unbridled militarization
From a global perspective, slowing arms races, buying time, and legitimating the 
continual modernization of national arsenals can serve to relax, if not transform, 
the urgency to build more and better arms To assist in regulating these processes 
there is a corresponding need for independent international agencies to monitor and 
measure the militarization process to determine whether it is getting out of hand and 
engulfing the non-coercive and civil forces of modernization Governments, as biased 
observers, are not always credible observers Regional security organizations —
NATO or the Warsaw Pact —  are similarly defective Their assessments are 
principally designed to magnify the threat posed by their opponents and to minimize 
the menace that their own military preparations, characterized with unfailing 
consistency as defensive, pose for others The United Nations is also flawed since 
it is currently more the battleground of nation-state conflicts than an arbiter
This pessimistic assessment notwithstanding, the global political community has 
made headway in creating institutions capable of objectively determining the real and 
potential costs of militarization Universities, their research centers, and 
professional academic associations, like the International Economics Association and 
the International Political Science Association, can play a useful role in developing 
the data and measures needed to know whether the trend toward militarization is 
increasing or decreasing They can usefully supplement the work of such 
international bodies as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) All of these 
instrumentalities are critical components of a worldwide network of independent 
centers dedicated to measuring militarization and to evaluating its impact on
modernization
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International efforts to build a body of reliable facts and measures of 
militarization cannot be expected to resolve the dilemmas of militarization and 
modernization They can be expected to produce a more revealing mirror than exists 
now, of the flaws and fissures of the world community Accurate diagnosis of te 
sources of conflct and their institutionalization and reinforcement within militry 
establishments and MISTs is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition of remedy 
Unless states and their societies know where they are in modernizing themselves and 
where they have been, it will be impossible, except by chance or force, to direct the 
global community down less destructive paths than those it has already stumbled 
along To be consistent with itself, modernity implies control over physical 
nature and over the instruments, including organized violence, that will fashion and 
fabricate a viable world community
Only a modernization process attentive to the global forces driving it will 
possess the guiding vision and capacity to mobilize world resources to discipline 
militarization to the conflicting imperatives of modernization the search for 
global order and legitimacy based on universally accepted principles of authoritative 
rule, increased prosperity and the equitable distribution of expanding global wealth, 
access to scientific knowledge and technological advancement, and a definition of 
personal worth that harmonizes, on the one hand, the competing notions of merit as a 
function of talent and performance and, on the other, the contesting demands of 
equality and personal freedom
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